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Fixing Faults in the Current Default Judgment 
Framework 
ARTHUR J. PARK∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The current default judgment system is filled with problems.  Default 
judgments are routinely set aside based upon the party’s “excusable ne-
glect”1 for failing to timely answer.  In such cases, the defaulting party’s 
negligence is essentially condoned because the non-defaulting party is not 
properly compensated for the delay and the defaulting party is not ade-
quately reprimanded.  Even after obtaining a default judgment, the non-
defaulting party may have its victory disappear if a motion to set aside is 
filed shortly thereafter.  On the other hand, some parties involved in litiga-
tion are ambushed with a default based on improper service.  By sitting on 
the judgment without giving notice or attempting to collect, the non-
defaulting party can even manipulate the one-year cutoff date in Rule 60 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the arguments that can be 
made in the motion to set aside.2  Fortunately, there are some simple solu-
tions to improve the default judgment framework. 
II. HISTORY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 
The major components of the current default judgment framework 
have been in place since adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
∗ Associate Attorney with Brewster, Morhous, Cameron, Caruth, Moore, Kersey & Staf-
ford, PLLC in Bluefield, West Virginia.  J.D., University of Mississippi; B.A., University of 
Georgia.  The Author’s practice consists primarily of insurance defense in Virginia and 
West Virginia.  Special thanks to Professor Michael Hoffheimer, Kermit J. Moore, and Jack 
L. Park, Jr. for reviewing previous drafts and offering their insightful suggestions. 
 1. Excusable neglect can include the illness or death of a party or counsel, confusion 
resulting from the withdrawal of counsel, difficulties because the defendant is from out-of-
state, misunderstandings between multiple defendants, clerical error, miscalculation of time, 
or honest mistakes.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). 
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in the 1930s.3  The enactment of Rule 554 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure represented “the joining of the equity decree pro confesso . . . 
and the judgment by default.”5  Thus, a brief look at the history of default 
judgments from both the equitable and legal side is instructive. 
The equitable decree pro confesso can be traced back to the days of 
the Roman Emperor Justinian.6  The initial English practice was to allow a 
decree pro confesso only if the defendant “had appeared but failed to file an 
answer after a demurrer was overruled.”7  The default was not applied 
broadly because the courts were cautious to accept as true every “fruitful 
fancy . . . a counsel could invent, suggest, or put into a bill.”8  If the de-
fendant failed to appear, the plaintiff had to request an order of sequestra-
tion against the defendant’s real and personal property (thus preventing the 
defendant from entering or using his property).9  If the defendant still failed 
to appear, the court would hold him in contempt.10  Only once the defend-
ant was forced to finally appear, “either to release the sequestration or to 
fulfill the contempt order,” was a decree pro confesso available.11 
English practice concerning default judgments was changed drastical-
ly in 1732 with the enactment of the Process Act.12  The Process Act stated 
that a court could issue an equitable decree pro confesso even if the de-
fendant did not appear.13 The Act required that, 
upon good showing to the court by plaintiff, the court could: first, place and 
publish the process in the London Gazette; second, publish the process on 
“some Lord’s Day, immediately after divine service, in the parish church of 
the parish;” and finally, post the process at some public place in the juris-
diction of the court.14 
The court could now enter a decree pro confesso after the plaintiff estab-
lished that service had been published in accordance with the statute.15  
 
 3. See John R. Hardin, Asserting Failure to State a Claim After Default Judgment Un-
der Both the Federal and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 131, 141 
(1999). 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee’s note. 
 6. Hardin, supra note 3, at 134. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Hawkins v. Crook, (1729) 24 Eng. Rep. 860 (Ch.) 860; 2 P. Wms. 556 (Eng.). 
 9. Hardin, supra note 3, at 134. 
 10. Id. at 135. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. The Process Act, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 25 (Eng.). 
 14. Hardin, supra note 3, at 135 (citations omitted). 
 15. Id. 
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Once such a decree was entered, the defendant had seven years in which to 
appear.16  If the defendant did not petition to set aside the decree within 
seven years, the decree remained “absolutely confirmed.”17 
The early American system, including the Federal Equity Rules of 
1822, followed the Process Act English model for a decree pro confesso: 
By our rules a decree pro confesso may be had if the defendant, on being 
served with process, fails to appear within the time required; or if, having 
appeared, he fails to plead, demur, or answer to the bill within the time lim-
ited for that purpose; or if he fails to answer after a former plea, demurrer, 
or answer is overruled or declared insufficient.18 
Once a decree pro confesso was entered, the court was to “decree upon the 
naked allegations of the complainants’ bill, and give the relief proper to the 
case.”19  The court could rule on “distinct and positive” allegations but had 
to receive additional proof when the allegations were “defective or 
vague.”20  After a decree pro confesso was entered, the defendant was abso-
lutely barred from any challenge that was not apparent on the face of the 
bill.21 
On the law side, courts of common law were allowed to enter a decree 
of nil dicit when the defendant had failed to plead, regardless of whether he 
or she had appeared.22  Thus, the distinguishing feature of the decree nil 
dicit was the court’s ability to find a defendant in default for failing to file 
even without an appearance.23  Defined literally, the term nil dicit means 
“he says nothing”24 and has also been viewed as “the technical form of 
judgment to be rendered where the defendant has entered a general appear-
ance, but has failed to plead, or where, having pleaded, his or her plea has 
been stricken out or is withdrawn or abandoned and no further defense is 
made.”25  The U.S. Supreme Court explained that, where a default nil dicit 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 112 (1885). 
 19. Williams v. Corwin, 1 Hopk. Ch. 471, 476 (N.Y. Ch. 1824). 
 20. Id. 
 21. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2681 (3d ed. 1998). 
 22. See Davis v. Davis, (1739) 26 Eng. Rep. 410 (Ch.) 412; 2 Atk. 21, 23 (Eng.);  Haw-
kins v. Crook, (1729) 24 Eng. Rep. 860 (Ch.) 862; 2 P. Wms. 556, 558–59. 
 23. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478, 517 (1854) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (citing 
Peto v. Attorney General, (1827) 148 Eng. Rep. 772 (Exch.) 772; 1 Y. & J. 509, 509) (“If he 
fails to appear, it is a nil dicit; and if he appears and will not answer, a decree pro confesso 
is taken.”). 
 24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (9th ed. 2009). 
 25. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 253 (2009). 
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was obtained, “judgment is immediately given in debt, or in all cases where 
the thing demanded is certain; but where the matter sued for consists in 
damages, a judgment interlocutory is given; after which a writ of inquiry 
goes to ascertain the damages, and then the judgment follows.”26 
The equitable pro confesso and the legal nil dicit were generally rec-
ognized as being quite similar.  The United States Supreme Court noted 
that “[t]he method in equity of taking a bill pro confesso is consonant to the 
rule and practice of the courts at law, where . . . the defendant makes de-
fault by nil dicit.”27  The analogy between the nil dicit proceeding in law 
and the pro confesso proceeding in equity “is obvious and striking.”28  As 
noted above, the two doctrines were ultimately combined in Rule 55 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.29 
III.  THE CURRENT DEFAULT JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK 
A.  Purpose of Default Judgment 
The purpose of default judgments is to protect a diligent party, “lest he 
be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights” 
whenever “the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially 
unresponsive party.”30  The theory behind default judgments is that, by its 
failure to timely answer, the defaulting party implicitly “admits the cause 
of action is valid, admits [it] has no defense, and consents to suffer judg-
ment.”31  When these presumptions turn out to be inaccurate, the default 
judgment stands as a penalty for the party’s failure to comply with the pro-
cedural rules and deadlines to answer.32 
Default judgments are also subject to competing policy considera-
 
 26. Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 111 (1885) (quoting Bills Taken Pro Confesso, 
(1744) 22 Eng. Rep. 152 (Ch.) 154 n.3; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 178, 179 n.3) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 27. Id. at 111 (quoting Bills Taken Pro Confesso, 22 Eng. Rep. at 154 n.3; 2 Eq. Cas. 
Abr. at 179 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. Id. 
 29. For more on the current rules of civil procedure pertaining to default judgments, see 
infra Part III.B. 
 30. H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 
(D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and 
the Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 765 (2000) (“The mechanism of default 
fosters efficiency and discourages delay by severely penalizing dilatory or procrastinating 
conduct.”). 
 31. Keeler Bros. v. Yellowstone Valley Nat’l. Bank, 235 F. 270, 270 (D. Mont. 1916). 
 32. Id. 
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tions.33  “[I]t is necessary for the court to balance what are at times conflict-
ing policy goals: the need for prompt and efficient handling of litigation in 
the federal courts by sound application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the attainment of a just resolution of the particular dispute before the 
court.”34  On one hand, the court’s procedural rules must be respected and 
enforced: 
One of the basic purposes of the Rules of Federal Procedure is to secure the 
“speedy” determination of pending litigation.  Since Magna Carta, delay 
has been recognized as pro tanto denial of justice.  In Shakespeare’s Ham-
let “the law’s delay” is condemned.  The evil is an old one.  It has merely 
become more widespread as the number of pending cases has increased in 
our urban civilization.  Theoretically and ideally the object of procedural 
rules is to accord a plaintiff the same relief which he would receive if the 
case were decided immediately at the moment of filing.  For the wrong (if 
any) has then occurred; the remedy should also be available at the same 
time.  Calendar control by the Courts and the setting of fixed dates for the 
various steps to be taken in the course of litigation are among the means by 
which it is sought to eliminate delay.  The bar must realize, and we declare 
it as emphatically as we can, that these dates fixed by law, rule, or court or-
der mean something.  They are not empty formalities.35 
In the words of Judge Posner, “[t]he threat of default is one of the district 
judges’ most important tools for obtaining compliance with litigation 
schedules.”36  When delay and noncompliance are condoned, the courts are 
unable to effectively manage their overburdened dockets.37 
The competing policy consideration is the judicial preference for just 
resolution of disputes on the merits.  Since courts prefer to decide cases on 
 
 33. See Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) (indicat-
ing that courts must preserve the balance between the “sanctity of final judgments” and the 
desire that “justice be done in light of all the facts”). 
 34. Gray v. John Jovino Co., 84 F.R.D. 46, 47 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (citing 6 WM. MOORE 
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 55.10 (2d ed. 1978)); see also Gomes v. Williams, 
420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970) (recognizing that the judicial preference for trial on 
merits “is counterbalanced by considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a 
weighing process which lies largely within the domain of the trial judge’s discretion”). 
 35. Canup v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. S.C. 1966) (“[T]he pro-
cess of the court is neither to be disregarded or ignored.  If this were not so, the orderly ad-
ministration of justice would lack its most important policing feature.”). 
 36. Anilina Fabrique de Colorants v. Aakash Chems. & Dyestuffs, Inc., 856 F.2d 873, 
882 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting); see also 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra 
note 21, § 2693 (stating that entries of default and default judgment “are significant weap-
ons for enforcing compliance with the rules of procedure and therefore facilitate the speedy 
determination of litigation”). 
 37. Anilina, 856 F.2d at 882. 
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the merits,38 the entry of a default judgment is not favored by the law.39  “In 
[the] final analysis, a court has the responsibility to do justice between man 
and man; and general principles cannot justify denial of a party’s fair day in 
court except upon a serious showing of willful default.”40  State courts also 
follow this general rule.41 
B.  Rules of Civil Procedure 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,42 default judgments are 
governed by Rule 55 and Rule 60.  One issue that practitioners (and even 
some judges) tend to confuse is the difference between a “default” and a 
“default judgment.”  The court clerk enters a default when a party fails to 
file an appropriate responsive pleading.  “When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must 
enter the party’s default.”43  The most common situation involving the en-
try of default occurs when a named defendant fails to file an answer after 
being served.44  It is important to note that a default always precedes a de-
 
 38. See, e.g., Gomes, 420 F.2d at 1366 (“The preferred disposition of any case is upon 
its merits and not by default judgment.”); Exxon Corp. v. Thomason, 504 S.E.2d 676, 677 
(Ga. 1998) (recognizing a “strong public policy . . . favoring resolution of cases on the mer-
its”). 
 39. See, e.g., In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 63 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
default judgment should be a “rare judicial act”); Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead 
& Sav. Ass’n., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Default judgments are a drastic remedy, 
not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.”); 
Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data Ctr., Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“Judgments by default are drastic remedies and should only be resorted to in extreme situa-
tions.”); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1977) (“[D]efault judgment 
is . . . a drastic sanction that should be employed only in an extreme situation.”). 
 40. Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Nat’l. Red Cross, 569 S.E.2d 242, 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2002), aff’d 578 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. 2003); McCain v. Dauzat, 791 So. 2d 839, 843 (Miss. 
2001) (“Default judgments are not favored,” and reasonable doubt “should be resolved in 
favor . . . [of] hearing the case on its merits.”); Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 256 
S.E.2d 758, 762 (W. Va. 1979) (“[W]e have established as a basic policy that cases should 
be decided on their merits, and consequently default judgments are not favored and a liberal 
construction should be accorded a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a default order.”). 
 42. Most states have adopted rules based on the federal model.  Compare, e.g., FED. R. 
CIV. P. 55, 60, with  MISS. R. CIV. P. 55, 60, and W. VA. R. CIV. P. 55, 60.  But see VA. SUP. 
CT. R. 3:19 (indicating that not all states have adopted the federal rules). 
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). 
 44. Entry of default under Rule 55(a) would also apply to plaintiffs failing to answer a 
counterclaim and third-party defendants failing to answer a third-party complaint.  See Pall 
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/5
PARK.DOCX 1/9/12  12:01 PM 
2011] FIXING FAULTS 161 
fault judgment, and the entry of default does not include an award of dam-
ages. 
Once the clerk has entered a default, a default judgment can be pur-
sued.  There are two ways to procure a default judgment.45  First, the court 
clerk may enter default judgment when the “plaintiff’s claim is for a sum 
certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation.”46  Second, the 
court may enter judgment when the amount in dispute is not for a sum cer-
tain.47  At this stage, the court may hold a hearing to “(A) conduct an ac-
counting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of 
any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.”48  As to 
damages, “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in 
amount, what [was] demanded in the         pleadings.”49 
Once a pleading has been properly served, Rule 55(b)(2) provides the 
only notice requirement in the default judgment framework: “If the party 
against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a 
representative, that party or its representative must be served with written 
notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.”50  In the most 
 
Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (permitting entry of default 
against plaintiff on counterclaim). 
 45. Although a default judgment is also available as a discovery sanction under Rule 
37(b)(2)(vi), that situation involves different policy considerations and is therefore outside 
the scope of this Article. 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1).  This method also requires an affidavit showing the amount 
due, but it is not available when the defaulting party is a minor or an incompetent person.  
Id. 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). 
 48. Id.  Additionally, in order to protect the interests of a minor or incompetent person, 
such a party must be represented by a guardian or conservator during this process.  Id. 
  A hearing is often required for sovereigns, as the non-defaulting party must provide 
additional evidence.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d) (“A default judgment may be entered against 
the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right 
to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.”); cf. Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain 
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994) (indicating a hearing is not always required for de-
fault judgment against sovereign).  The United States Code mirrors Rule 55(d): 
  No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a 
State against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right 
to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2006). 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).  Surprisingly, the moving party is not required to give any 
form of notice to the defaulting party for the entry of default under Rule 55(a) or for a de-
fault judgment under Rule 55(b)(1).  Even the court clerk is not required to give notice to 
the defaulting party. The Rules indicates that “[i]mmediately after entering an order or 
7
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common scenario, a defendant fails to file a timely answer to a complaint.  
When such a situation occurs, the defendant has not “appeared personally 
or by a representative,” so no additional notice is required under Rule 
55(b)(2).51 
Rule 55 also provides the basic rule for how an entry of default or a 
default judgment may be set aside: “The court may set aside an entry of de-
fault for good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 
60(b).”52 Rule 60(b) states: 
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following rea-
sons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion, or misconduct by an opposing party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on 
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it pro-
spectively is no longer equitable; or 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.53 
As to timing, “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a 
reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after 
 
judgment, the clerk must serve notice of the entry . . . on each party who is not in default for 
failing to appear.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1).  However, the non-defaulting party would have 
to give notice to any other parties in the litigation, but not the defaulting party, as to any mo-
tions filed.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a)(1)(D) (requiring written motions to be served on all par-
ties); FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a)(2) (“No service is required on a party who is in default for failing 
to appear.”). 
 51. In extraordinary circumstances, a party can “appear” without filing a responsive 
pleading.  See Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exch., 653 F.2d 270, 271 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(finding a conversation between defendant’s counsel and plaintiff’s counsel concerning the 
suit to be sufficient to constitute appearance); Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data 
Ctr., Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977) (determining that letters and phone calls from 
defendant’s counsel constituted appearance); FROF, Inc. v. Harris, 695 F. Supp. 827, 830 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that a single letter from defendant’s attorney to plaintiff’s attorney 
was an appearance); Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 491, 492 (S.D. Tex. 
1961) (finding that a defendant’s letter to plaintiff constituted an appearance). 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
8
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the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”54 
C.  Case Law on Setting Aside Default Judgments 
1.  Factors to be Considered 
When hearing a motion to set aside a default judgment,55 the court will 
consider a number of factors.  The federal courts have identified as many as 
seven distinct factors: 
(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether setting it aside would prej-
udice the adversary; (3) whether a meritorious defense is presented; (4) the 
nature of the defendant’s explanation for the default; (5) the good faith of 
the parties; (6) the amount of money involved; (7) the timing of the mo-
tion.56 
Courts apply the same factors to a motion to set aside entry of default 
and to a motion to set aside default judgment; however, the factors are con-
strued more liberally in a motion to set aside a mere entry of default.57 
In listing the factors, federal courts are split on whether the effective-
 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). 
 55. This motion is also sometimes referred to as a motion to vacate the judgment. 
 56. KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).  Factors 
considered by state courts tend to be quite similar.  See, e.g., Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply 
Corp., 256 S.E.2d 758, 762 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that the court must consider the follow-
ing factors: “(1) The degree of prejudice suffered by the plaintiff from the delay in answer-
ing; (2) the presence of material issues of fact and meritorious defenses; (3) the significance 
of the interests at stake; and (4) the degree of intransigence on the part of the defaulting par-
ty.”).  In Georgia, the factors considered are: 
  [W]hether and how the opposing party will be prejudiced by opening the de-
fault; whether the opposing party elected not to raise the default issue until after 
the time . . . had expired for the defaulting party to open default as a matter of 
right; and whether the defaulting party acted promptly to open default upon learn-
ing no answer had been either filed or timely filed. 
Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 490 S.E.2d 415, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).  Mississippi 
courts consider: 
  (1) [t]he nature and legitimacy of a defendant's reasons for default, i.e., wheth-
er a defendant has good cause for default; (2) whether the defendant has a colora-
ble defense to the merits of the claim, and (3) the nature and extent of prejudice 
that a plaintiff would suffer if default is set aside. 
Chassaniol v. Bank of Kilmichael, 626 So. 2d 127, 135 (Miss. 1993). 
 57. Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The same considerations 
exist when deciding whether to set aside either an entry of default or a default judgment, but 
they are to be applied more liberally when reviewing an entry of default.”).  The underlying 
rationale is the respect for the finality of judgments. 
9
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ness of alternative sanctions should be considered.58  On one hand, the 
Third and Fourth Circuits have expressly recognized alternative sanctions 
as a factor that the district court must take into account.59  While not reject-
ing alternative sanctions outright, the other circuits have not found this fac-
tor to be significant.60  As discussed below, the effectiveness of alternative 
sanctions is an important factor that every court should consider when hear-
ing a motion to set aside default judgment.61 
2.  The Excusable Neglect Standard 
Under Rule 60(b)(1), a default judgment may be set aside for “excus-
able neglect.”  Prior to 1993, two distinct standards had developed with re-
spect to what type of conduct constituted excusable neglect.62  The Second, 
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits took “the stance that a court should vacate 
a default judgment except upon a showing of willful or culpable conduct or 
bad faith on the part of the movant.”63  This liberal view is based on the ju-
dicial preference for trial on the merits and a broad construction of Rule 60 
to accomplish justice.64  Under the liberal standard, excusable neglect can 
include the illness or death of a party or counsel, confusion resulting from 
the withdrawal of counsel, difficulties for out-of-state defendants, misun-
derstandings between multiple defendants, clerical error, miscalculation of 
 
 58. While there may be some overlap between Rule 37 and Rule 55 regarding the sanc-
tion issue, this essay is limited to the policy considerations of Rule 55 and the failure to 
timely answer. 
 59. Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73–74 (3d Cir. 1987); United States. v. 
Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 60. See KPS, 318 F.3d at 12 (1st Cir.); SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 
1998); Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 1996); Compania Interamericana 
Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana De Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 
1996); In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 63 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1995); Info. Sys. & Net-
works Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Daily, 973 F.2d 
1525, 1529 (10th Cir. 1992); Berthelsen, 907 F.2d at 620 (6th Cir.); Eitel v. McCool, 782 
F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 763 F.2d 
181 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 61. See infra Part V.C. 
 62. See generally Brett Warren Weathersbee, Note, No More Excuses: Refusing to 
Condone Mere Carelessness or Negligence Under the “Excusable Neglect” Standard in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 50 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (1997). 
 63. Id. at 1624–25 (citing Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2nd 
Cir. 1996); Amernational Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 978 (6th Cir. 
1991); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521–22 (9th Cir. 1987); Gross v. 
Stereo Component Sys., 700 F.2d 120, 124 (3rd Cir. 1983)). 
 64. Id. at 1625. 
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time, or honest mistakes.65 
On the other hand, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits de-
fined excusable neglect “narrowly and expressly reject[ed] requests to va-
cate default judgments that result from mere carelessness or negligence.”66  
This strict view is based on “ensuring finality of judgments, promoting ju-
dicial efficiency, deterring inappropriate behavior and holding clients ac-
countable for the acts of their agent.”67  Under the strict standard, the fol-
lowing conduct did not constitute excusable neglect: miscommunication 
with a party’s insurance company,68 failing to open mail containing service 
of process before taking a vacation,69 and missing deadlines due to coun-
sel’s heavy caseload and scheduling conflicts.70 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court discussed the “excusable 
neglect” standard in the context of Rule 9006(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure.71  In short, the Court held that excusable neglect in-
cludes the failure to comply with a filing deadline that is attributable to 
negligence.72  The Court stated that “Congress plainly contemplated that 
the courts would be permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings 
caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening 
circumstances beyond the party’s control.”73  As such, the Court rejected 
the strict view, discussed above, that excusable neglect should only apply 
to circumstances beyond the party’s control and that attorney negligence is 
always an insufficient ground.74  As to the requirement that the neglect be 
“excusable,” the Court established a balancing test which requires an equi-
table determination “taking account of all relevant circumstances surround-
ing the party’s omission.”75  These factors include “the danger of prejudice 
to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
 
 65. 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2695 (collecting cases). 
 66. Weathersbee, supra note 62, at 1628 (citing Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 
F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1990); Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 
167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 
1069 (5th Cir. 1994); C.K.S. Engineers, Inc. v. White Mt. Gypsum Co., 726 F.2d 1202 (7th 
Cir. 1984)); Sutherland v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 710 F.2d 473, 476–77 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 67. Weathersbee, supra note 62, at 1639. 
 68. Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 69. CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, 979 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 70. Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 71. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 382–83 
(1993). 
 72. Id. at 394–95. 
 73. Id. at 388. 
 74. Id. at 391–92, 395. 
 75. Id. at 395. 
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proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good 
faith.”76 
While its holding was limited to the bankruptcy rules, the Pioneer 
Court noted that the concept of “neglect” for purposes of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) “encompass[es] situations in which the failure to 
comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence.”77 Immediately 
following the Pioneer decision in 1993, the courts expressed some doubts 
regarding the proper “excusable neglect” standard for the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.78 
In 1996, the Supreme Court stated that the Pioneer analysis also ap-
plies to “excusable neglect” in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.79  Following this additional guidance that Pioneer is not limited 
to the bankruptcy context, every federal circuit court has now extended the 
Pioneer test for excusable neglect to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.80  Under Pioneer, the bar is quite low when it comes to 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 394. 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. RG & B Contractors, Inc., 21 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 
1994) (assuming arguendo that Pioneer applied in the context of Rule 60(b)). 
 79. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 195 (1996). 
 80. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 
866 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. 
Dem. Rep. Congo, 447 F.3d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“While Pioneer involved ‘excusable 
neglect’ under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) . . . , the same test governs our determination 
under Rule 60(b)(1).”); Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 856 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying 
Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); George Harms Constr. Co., v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 163–64 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Pioneer factors for excusable neglect in the context of Rule 60(b)(1)); 
Point PCS, LLC v. Sea Haven Realty & Constr., 95 F. App’x. 24, 27 (4th Cir. 2004) (district 
court was correct to apply Pioneer factors); Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 
355, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (“‘[W]e have held that Pioneer's ‘more liberal’ definition of excus-
able neglect is applicable beyond the bankruptcy context . . . .’” (quoting Canfield v. Van 
Atta Buick/GMC Truck Inc., 127 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam))); McCurry 
ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 595 (6th Cir. 2002) (ap-
plying Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Pioneer Court’s construction of ‘excusable neglect’ was apparently gen-
erally applicable, as the Court claimed to be adopting ‘the commonly accepted meaning of 
the phrase.’”); Robb v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 122 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying 
Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 
1997) (“We now hold that the equitable test set out in Pioneer applies to Rule 60(b).”); Pratt 
v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Pioneer appeared on its face to resolve only 
a narrow issue of bankruptcy practice.  But by construing ‘excusable neglect,’ a phrase used 
throughout the Federal Civil, Criminal and Appellate Rules of Procedure, Pioneer must be 
understood to provide guidance outside the bankruptcy context.”); Cheney v. Anchor Glass 
Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 849–50 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); 
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proving excusable neglect.81 
3.  Timing of the Motion to Set Aside 
While the court must consider a number of factors when ruling on a 
motion to set aside default judgment, the timing of the motion is usually of 
critical importance.82  The timing of the motion is itself often listed as a 
factor to consider.83  In addition, the time involved always colors the re-
maining factors.  Generally, when the motion to set aside is filed shortly 
after the default judgment, (1) the default was likely not willful; (2) the ad-
versary faces little prejudice; (3) the defaulting party’s explanation is more 
plausible; and (4) the defaulting party likely acted in good faith.84  When 
the motion to set aside is filed long after the default judgment, (1) the de-
 
Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (choosing 
to apply the balancing test set forth in Pioneer). 
  Thus, the federal courts have rejected the argument that Pioneer should not be ex-
tended to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).  For such an argument, see Weathersbee, supra note 62, 
at 1631–36. 
 81. See, e.g., Cheney, 71 F.3d at 850 (holding that carelessness and oversight constitute 
excusable neglect).  However, the states remain free to set their own standards and define 
excusable neglect as used in their own rules.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-60(d)(2) 
(2006) (stating that a judgment may be set aside for “[f]raud, accident, or mistake or the acts 
of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant”); Carter v. Raven-
wood Dev. Co., 549 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (defining excusable neglect to ex-
clude gross negligence). 
 82. The burden of proof remains the same, regardless of when the motion to set aside 
default judgment is filed.  However, some states have different procedures based on when 
the motion is made.  See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4) (allowing for a more lenient standard 
within 30 days); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:19(d) (allowing for a more lenient standard within 21 
days); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-55(a) (stating that default may be opened as a matter of right 
within 15 days). 
 83. See, e.g., KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); 
Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 1996); Compania Interamericana Export-
Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana De Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996); In 
re Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Foster’s Truck & Equip. Sales, Inc., 63 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 
1995). 
 84. See generally Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981); Patapoff 
v. Vollstedt’s Inc., 267 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1959); Reynal v. United States, 153 F.2d 929 (5th 
Cir. 1945); FOC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l City Commercial Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 
1080 (D. Ariz. 2009); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. T & N Ltd., 191 F.R.D. 522, 529 (E.D. Tex. 
2000); Caruso v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Nicholson v. Al-
lied Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Delapp v. Delapp, 584 S.E.2d 899, 906 
(W. Va. 2003); State ex rel. United Mine Workers of Am., Local Union 1938 v. Waters, 489 
S.E.2d 266, 276 (W. Va. 1997); Evans v. Holt, 457 S.E.2d 515, 524 (W. Va. 1995); Cnty. 
Comm’n v. Hanson, 415 S.E.2d 607, 610 (W. Va. 1992); Cunningham v. Mitchell, 549 So. 
2d 955 (Miss. 1989). 
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fault likely was willful; (2) the adversary faces significant prejudice; (3) the 
defaulting party’s explanation is less plausible; and (4) the defaulting party 
probably did not act in good faith.85 
In this author’s review of the published cases and in general practice, 
the timing of the motion to set aside creates the following results.  A mo-
tion to set aside default judgment filed within one month of the judgment is 
almost always granted.86  When the motion is filed within three months of 
the default, the defaulting party generally prevails.87  Motions to set aside 
 
 85. See generally Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Semaphore Adver., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 715 
(S.D. Ga. 1990); A-Plus Answering Serv., Inc. v. Elmhurst Answering Exch., Inc., 74 
F.R.D. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Seanor v. Bair Transp. Co. of Del., 54 F.R.D. 35 (E.D. Pa. 
1971); Groves v. Roy G. Hildreth & Son, Inc., 664 S.E.2d 531, 539–40 (W. Va. 2008); 
Realco, LLC v. Apex Rests., Inc., 624 S.E.2d 594, 597 (W. Va. 2005); Cook v. Channel 
One, Inc., 549 S.E.2d 306, 310 (W. Va. 2001); Lee v. Gentlemen's Club, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 
78, 82 (W. Va. 2000); Overbey v. Murray, 569 So. 2d 303 (Miss. 1990). 
 86. See, e.g., Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 399 (noting motion was filed within twelve days 
of learning of default judgment); Patapoff, 267 F.2d at 864 (noting appellant moved to va-
cate ten days after order); Reynal, 153 F.2d at 931–32 (noting motion was filed within thirty 
days of default); FOC Fin., 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (noting Defendant filed motion two 
days after default was entered); Owens-Illinois, 191 F.R.D. at 529 (noting appellant moved 
to vacate three days after it learned of default); Caruso, 78 F.R.D. at 588 (noting motion was 
filed less than one month after default entered); Nicholson, 200 F. Supp. at 206 (setting 
aside default when motion was filed seventeen days after default was entered). 
  A similar result is reached in states, such as West Virginia, that have adopted Rules 
of Civil Procedure that closely follow the federal system.  See, e.g., Delapp, 584 S.E.2d at 
906 (noting motion was filed within two days of default); Waters, 489 S.E.2d at 276 (noting 
motion was filed within eleven days of default); Evans, 457 S.E.2d at 524 (noting appel-
lant’s motion was filed within one month of learning of default); Hanson, 415 S.E.2d at 610 
(noting motion was filed within twenty-five days of default). 
  Though still modeled on the federal framework, some states do not use a one-year 
cutoff in Rule 60 and thus do not fit neatly into the present analysis.  For example, Missis-
sippi includes a six-month cutoff date.  However, even Mississippi courts recognize that a 
motion to set aside default judgment is virtually guaranteed to be granted when made within 
one month.  See Cunningham v. Mitchell, 549 So. 2d 955, 958 (Miss. 1989) (granting mo-
tion after twenty-nine days). 
  Other states have created their own specific rules as to timing.  See, e.g., GA. CODE 
ANN. § 9-11-60(f) (2006) (stating that motion to set aside judgment must be brought within 
three years unless ground is lack of jurisdiction); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (2007) (estab-
lishing that, after 21 days have passed, default judgment can be set aside only on the follow-
ing grounds: “(i) fraud on the court, (ii) a void judgment, (iii) on proof of an accord and sat-
isfaction, or (iv) on proof that the defendant was, at the time of service of process or entry of 
judgment, a person in the military service of the United States”). 
 87. See, e.g., Allen Russell Publ’g., Inc. v. Levy, 109 F.R.D. 315, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(granting relief after nine weeks); United States v. 96 Cases of Fireworks, 244 F. Supp. 272, 
273 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (noting that only seven weeks passed between default and motion to 
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default judgment filed between three and six months have achieved mixed 
results.88  The defaulting party generally loses when he or she files a mo-
tion after more than six months.89  So long as the court has jurisdiction,90 it 
is virtually impossible for a defaulting party to prevail after twelve or more 
months have passed because of the one-year cutoff found in Rule 60(c) for 
arguing excusable neglect, new evidence, or fraud.91 
Under Rule 60(c), a defaulting party can only argue the following 
grounds after “more than a year after the entry of the judgment”: the judg-
ment is void; the judgment has been satisfied, released, discharged, or is 
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or any oth-
er reason that justifies relief.92  Reading Rule 60 in its entirety, the phrase 
“any other reason that justifies relief” cannot possibly include the argu-
 
set aside); Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 256 S.E.2d 758, 763 (W. Va. 1979) (noting 
period of delay was only six weeks). 
 88. Compare, e.g., Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 899 F.2d 109, 
112 (1st Cir. 1990) (denying motion after approximately four months), and United States v. 
Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 951 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (denying motion 
after more than three months), with Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1984) (grant-
ing motion after five months), and Kulakowich v. A/S Borgestad, 36 F.R.D. 185, 186 (E.D. 
Pa. 1964) (granting motion after four months). 
 89. See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light, 747 F. Supp. at 718 (denying motion after ten months); 
Cook, 549 S.E.2d at 310 (denying motion after eleven months); Lee, 542 S.E.2d at 82 (deny-
ing motion after seven months). 
 90. In particular, “courts have failed to develop a uniform rule in Rule 60(b)(4) motions 
for allocating the burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction.”  Ariel Waldman, 
Allocating the Burden of Proof in Rule 60(b)(4) Motions to Vacate A Default Judgment for 
Lack of Jurisdiction, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 529 (2001). 
  Texas state law offers a possible improvement on this issue, requiring “strict com-
pliance” with the service of process rules; otherwise, the default judgment can be set aside 
for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(4).  Susan Jean Miller, Misnomers: De-
fault Judgments and Strict Compliance with Service of Process Rules, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 
633, 641–42 (1994) (citing McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. 1965)). 
 91. See, e.g., A-Plus Answering Serv., Inc. v. Elmhurst Answering Exch., Inc., 74 
F.R.D. 157, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying a motion filed one year and two days after entry 
of default judgment); Seanor v. Bair Transp. Co. of Del., 54 F.R.D. 35, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1971) 
(denying a motion filed thirteen months after entry of default judgment).  But see Marquette 
Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799, 802–03 (D.S.C. 1964) (granting a motion filed after fif-
teen months on the grounds that the judgment was void). 
  Again, the same result is reached in states with a one-year cutoff as part of Rule 60.  
See, e.g., Realco, LLC v. Apex Rests., Inc., 624 S.E.2d 594, 597 (W. Va. 2005) (denying 
motion after twelve months).  But see Groves v. Roy G. Hildreth & Son, Inc., 664 S.E.2d 
531, 539-41 (W. Va. 2008) (granting motion after fourteen months). 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). 
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ments of excusable neglect, new evidence, or fraud.93 
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM FROM A PRACTITIONER’S 
POINT OF VIEW 
From a practitioner’s point of view, the present default judgment sys-
tem has significant problems for both non-defaulting parties and defaulting 
parties.  As noted above, excusable neglect is the most common ground for 
setting aside a default judgment since the courts have developed a rather 
liberal standard.94  When arguing that its failure to timely answer was due 
to excusable neglect, the defaulting party concedes that it is to blame and, 
in many instances, that it acted negligently.  When the court sets aside the 
default judgment due to excusable neglect, the defaulting party usually fac-
es little or no adverse consequence for its failure to comply with the Rules 
of Civil Procedure and its negligent conduct.95  As one commentator has 
noted: 
The drafters did not intend the rule to be, nor should it be, a license for par-
ties and their counsel to disregard process or procedural rules with impuni-
ty, to fail to exercise due diligence in regard to litigation, or to impede the 
 
 93. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) 
(stating that the “provisions [of Rule 60(b)] are mutually exclusive, and thus a party who 
failed to take timely action due to ‘excusable neglect’ may not seek relief more than a year 
after the judgment by resorting to subsection (6)”). In Klapprott v. United States, the Su-
preme Court said: 
[O]f course, the one year limitation would control if no more than “neglect” was 
disclosed by the petition.  In that event the petitioner could not avail himself of the 
broad “any other reason” clause . . . .  In simple English, the language of the “oth-
er reason” clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power 
in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is 
appropriate to accomplish justice. 
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613–15 (1948). When addressing the issue, the 
Seventh Circuit held: 
[I]f the asserted grounds for relief fall within the terms of the first three clauses of 
Rule 60(b), relief under the catchall provision is not available.  The rationale un-
derlying this principle is that the one year time limit applicable to the first three 
clauses of Rule 60(b) would be meaningless if relief was also available under the 
catchall provision. 
Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1989).  For a discussion 
of when Rule 60(b)(6) might include excusable neglect in limited circumstances, see infra 
Part V.D. 
 94. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 95. See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2693 (“Although many judges 
speak of the importance of compliance with the rules, the punitive value of imposing a de-
fault often is subordinated to a preference for a trial on the merits.”). 
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efforts of other litigants vigorously pursuing their cases.  To condone such 
behavior makes a mockery of Rule 60(b).96 
When a properly obtained default judgment is set aside, counsel for the 
non-defaulting party is not compensated for his time in obtaining the de-
fault, and the court’s time is wasted as the entire litigation returns to square 
one, i.e., the filing of a responsive pleading. 
After the default judgment has been entered, the prevailing party still 
has the Sword of Damocles hovering over its head.  The default judgment 
will likely be set aside if the defaulting party files its motion within three 
months and will almost always be set aside if the motion is filed within one 
month.97 
One could argue that pre-judgment interest is a sufficient remedy for 
the non-defaulting party when a default judgment is set aside; interest is 
accruing on his or her damages during the months that the trial was de-
layed.  However, there are two errors in such an argument.  First, most civil 
cases will ultimately end in a settlement, and thus a binding order with pre-
judgment interest is rarely entered on the court record.  Second, the issue of 
fault remains unsettled when a default judgment is set aside.  Accordingly, 
the non-defaulting party is not guaranteed pre-judgment interest every time 
that a default judgment is set aside.  While pre-judgment interest may be 
somewhat of a factor in settlement negotiations, the possible recovery of 
pre-judgment interest is neither a sufficient remedy to the non-defaulting 
party nor a sufficient sanction to the defaulting party. 
Defaulting parties (or at least parties allegedly in default) face prob-
lems with the current framework as well.  One example is defaults based on 
improper service.  The premise of a default is that the party failed to answer 
after being served.98  Obviously, that party should only be deemed liable if 
it fails to answer after being properly served.  However, one of the litigants 
often moves for entry of a default and a default judgment based on improp-
er service.99  If the court allows this type of conduct to continue unchecked, 
parties will simply file an answer, regardless of whether service was prop-
 
 96. Weathersbee, supra note 62, at 1646. 
 97. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 98. Of course, parties often waive formal service of process under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(d).  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A), the defendant has ei-
ther twenty-one days or sixty days to answer, depending on whether he or she waives ser-
vice. 
 99. This scenario is especially troubling given that many parties allegedly in default 
also fail to appear at the hearing (or challenge the default) since notice is not required. 
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er, rather than risk a default.100  Thus, there is also no incentive for the par-
ty seeking redress to go to the trouble of rendering proper service when im-
proper service achieves the same result.  While a default judgment based on 
improper service would eventually be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4),101 the 
current system does not properly discourage counsel from effecting im-
proper service. 
Perhaps the most troubling problem facing the defaulting party is ma-
nipulation of the one-year cutoff date for making certain arguments in the 
motion to set aside.102  As discussed above, the cutoff date found in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) plays a substantial role in whether a motion 
to set aside default judgment will be granted.103  When the defaulting party 
fails to file its motion within the one-year timeframe, the default judgment 
will almost always be upheld.104  The prevailing party generally has multi-
ple years (even decades in some states) to collect on a judgment,105 so the 
prevailing party does not have to begin its collection attempts right away.  
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the defaulting party is not enti-
tled to receive notice from the court that a final judgment has been entered 
against it.106  What should happen if the non-defaulting party intentionally 
attempted to manipulate the one-year cutoff date of Rule 60? 
In Hartwell v. Marquez, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted its 
concern over that possible scenario.107  After receiving the plaintiff’s com-
plaint, the defendant’s insurer failed to timely answer.108  The plaintiff then 
obtained an entry of default and a default judgment, with damages being 
calculated by the court under Rule 55(b)(2).109  After the judgment was en-
tered, plaintiff’s counsel took no action until the Rule 60 cutoff date 
 
 100. In practice, a motion to dismiss for insufficient process or insufficient service of 
process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) simply results in proper service at a 
later date and increased costs. 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4). 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).  Some states have adopted a version of Rule 60 with a cut-
off date other than one-year.  See, e.g., MISS. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (providing for a six-month 
cutoff date). 
 103. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 105. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-18(a) (2005) (giving the prevailing party a ten-
year, renewable period to collect on judgment). 
 106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1). 
 107. Hartwell v. Marquez, 498 S.E.2d 1, 4 n.5 (W. Va. 1997). 
 108. Id. at 3. 
 109. Id. at 4, 10. 
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passed.110  Just after the cutoff date, plaintiff’s counsel began the collec-
tions process.111  The Hartwell Court noted that “[t]his delay was apparent-
ly calculated to limit [the defaulting party’s] options under the provisions 
of W. VA. R. CIV. P. 60(b).”112  While such a delay did not technically vio-
late any statutory or court rule,113 the West Virginia Supreme Court 
“strongly urge[d]” practitioners to avoid the practice.114  In addition, the 
Hartwell Court implied that such conduct likely violates the ethical rules of 
conduct for attorneys.115 
V. HOW TO IMPROVE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK 
While the current default judgment framework suffers from a number 
of ills, the system could be greatly improved with a few simple changes.  
These changes include amending Rule 55 to allow for the recovery of at-
torney’s fees, making attorney’s fees a condition to setting aside a default 
judgment, considering alternative sanctions as a factor, and viewing failure 
to execute within one year as a factor under Rule 60(b)(6).  Although attor-
 
 110. Id. at 4.  As of 1997, Rule 60 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provid-
ed for an eight-month cutoff date; the current version includes a one-year timeframe. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 4 n.5. 
 113. Although failing to inform the defendant’s insurer of the default judgment has been 
held to constitute “misconduct of an adverse party” under Rule 60(b)(3), McGee v. Reyn-
olds, 618 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), that subsection is still subject to the one-year 
limitation.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c).  For analysis of McGee, see William F. Harvey, Default 
Judgment—Set Aside Because of Attorney’s Misconduct and Other Grounds, 37 RES 
GESTAE 466, 466–67 (1994). 
 114. Hartwell, 498 S.E.2d at 4 n.5. 
 115. Id. (citing W. VA. STANDARDS OF PROF’L CONDUCT S. I.B.9).  See also MODEL 
RULES OF. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness.”); id. R. 3.2 (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation.”); 
id. R. 3.2 cmt. (1983) (“Delay should not be indulged merely . . . for the purpose of frustrat-
ing an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. . . .”); id. R. 3.4 (2002) 
(addressing general fairness to opposing party and opposing counsel). 
  However, ethical rules, standing alone, are probably insufficient to solve the prob-
lems associated with default judgments.  See Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: De-
fault Judgments and the Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 785 (2000).  Glist 
noted that 
  [c]ivility codes, despite their rhetoric, too often focus on narrow “craft” stand-
ards--such as when to forbear seeking a default judgment. When this prohibition is 
examined closely, it appears rooted in a reflexive nostalgia.  Advocates of greater 
civility should offer, rather than simple pleas, straightforward procedural reforms 
that benefit both lawyers and the unrepresented. 
Id. 
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ney’s fees are generally not awarded under the American rule,116 making 
such an award available within the court’s discretion for default judgments 
would encourage compliance with procedural rules, reduce the prejudice 
suffered by the non-defaulting party when a default judgment is set aside, 
and punish failure to comply with procedural rules without imposing the 
drastic remedy of a default judgment. 
A.  Amend Rule 55 to Allow for the Recovery of Attorney’s Fees 
It is certainly nothing new for a rule of civil procedure to allow the 
judge to award reasonable attorney’s fees.  For example, the court may or-
der an award of attorney’s fees when a party violates Rule 11,117 submits an 
improper discovery document,118 impedes or frustrates the fair examination 
in a deposition,119 fails to appear for a deposition,120 or imposes an undue 
burden through the use of a subpoena.121 
Rule 37 regarding motions to compel the production of documents 
would serve as a good model.  Rule 37 gives the judge discretion to award 
attorney’s fees to either party depending on whether the motion to compel 
is granted or denied.122  Using Rule 37 as a guide, Rule 55(c) should be 
amended to include the following language: 
The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set 
aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b). 
(1) If the Motion to Set Aside Is Granted.  If the motion to set aside is 
granted, the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the 
non-defaulting party to pay the defaulting party’s reasonable expenses in-
curred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees, or require the de-
faulting party to pay the non-defaulting party’s reasonable expenses in-
curred in obtaining the default or default judgment, including attorney’s 
fees.  But the court must not order this payment if the party’s action was 
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(2) If the Motion to Set Aside Is Denied.  If the motion to set aside is de-
 
 116. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973) (“Although the traditional American rule 
ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys’ fees in the absence of statutory or contractu-
al authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attor-
neys’ fees when the interests of justice so require.”). 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2). 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(g). 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1). 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5). 
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nied, the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the de-
faulting party to pay the non-defaulting party’s reasonable expenses in-
curred, including attorney’s fees, in (i) obtaining the default or default 
judgment, and (ii) opposing the motion to set aside.  But the court must not 
order this payment if the motion to set aside was substantially justified or 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.123 
Rule 55 should be amended to give judges discretion to award a rea-
sonable attorney’s fee to either party.124  Attorney’s fees should be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis.  In cases involving clearly improper service, 
attorney’s fees could be awarded to the allegedly defaulting party.125  When 
the court sets aside a default judgment for excusable neglect, attorney’s 
fees could be awarded to the non-defaulting party to compensate counsel 
for obtaining the default judgment and to reduce the prejudice on the non-
defaulting party.  If the federal version of Rule 55 is amended to allow at-
torney’s fees, most states will likely follow suit.  However, if Rule 55 is not 
amended on the federal level, the individual states should take it upon 
themselves to amend their own versions of Rule 55. 
B.  Attorney’s Fees as a Condition to Setting Aside Default Judgment 
Under the current framework, a number of courts have set aside a de-
fault judgment only upon the condition that the defaulting party be respon-
sible for the non-defaulting party’s related attorney’s fees.126  Reasonable 
 
 123. Granted, such an amendment is not necessary in the circuits, as discussed infra 
Parts V.B–C, that use attorney’s fees as a condition to setting aside default judgment or con-
sider the availability of lesser sanctions as a factor.  However, a number of circuits and 
states do not use these methods.  Amending Rule 55 would be a quick, nationwide solution 
that would not require piecemeal implementation by the courts. 
 124. Rule 55 covers both defaults and default judgments whereas Rule 60 is the control-
ling standard for setting aside all types of judgment.  In other words, all defaults must run 
through Rule 55.  However, amending Rule 60 would solve the attorney’s fee issue for de-
fault judgments, but not mere defaults.  In addition, allowing attorney’s fees for the setting 
aside of judgments based on excusable neglect, fraud, etc. would also make sense. 
 125. Attorney’s fees would not be warranted for a technically improper service that was 
made in good faith. 
 126. See, e.g., Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1989); Weary v. Sailorman, 
Inc., No. CIVA2:07CV3KS-MTP, 2008 WL 321510, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 4, 2008); U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., 220 F.R.D. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Goodwin v. Roper Indus., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Me. 1986); Leab v. Streit, 584 F. 
Supp. 748, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
  Although not modeled on the federal rules, Virginia allows the court to use recovery 
of attorney’s fees as a condition when setting aside a default judgment.  VA. SUP. CT. R. 
3:19(d)(1). 
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conditions may be imposed in granting a motion to set aside default judg-
ment, and the condition most commonly imposed is that the defaulting par-
ty must reimburse the non-defaulting party for costs incurred because of the 
default.127  After all, Rule 60(b) states that the court may set aside a judg-
ment “[o]n motion and just terms.”128  As the Ninth Circuit has explained: 
  By conditioning the setting aside of a default, any prejudice suffered by 
the non-defaulting party as a result of the default and the subsequent reo-
pening of the litigation can be rectified. . . . [T]he most common type of 
prejudice is the additional expense caused by the delay, the hearing on the 
Rule 55(c) motion, and the introduction of new issues.  Courts have eased 
these burdens by requiring the defaulting party to provide a bond to pay 
costs, to pay court costs, or to cover the expenses of the appeal.  The use of 
imposing conditions can serve to “promote the positive purposes of the de-
fault procedures without subjecting either litigant to their drastic conse-
quences.”129 
In addition, this method is not overly burdensome on all defaulting 
parties since it is only invoked on a case-by-case basis.130  Imposing a rea-
sonable attorney’s fee as a condition “can be used to rectify any prejudice 
suffered by the non-defaulting party as a result of the default and the sub-
sequent reopening of the litigation.”131  Again, the court should have broad 
discretion given the vast possibility of factual scenarios involved, rather 
than automatically awarding attorney’s fees in every case.132 
 
  It appears this idea has been around for almost one hundred years but has not been 
uniformly applied.  See Keeler Bros. v. Yellowstone Valley Nat. Bank, 235 F. 270, 271 (D. 
Mont. 1916) (setting aside default judgment on condition that defaulting party “pays all ac-
crued costs and an attorney’s attendance fee herein of $25”). 
 127. Wokan v. Alladin Int’l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1234 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing J. M. 
Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Conditions Imposed in Granting Relief from Judgment Un-
der Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1970)); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 
692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (collecting cases). 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 129. Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 
1538, 1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (quoting 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, su-
pra note 21, § 2700). 
 130. See Na Pali Haweo Cmty. Ass’n v. Grande, 252 F.R.D. 672, 674 (D. Haw. 2008) 
(recognizing the availability of attorney’s fees but choosing not to award them); Pall Corp. 
v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to grant attorney’s fees based 
on court’s discretion). 
 131. 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2700 (noting that prejudice to a 
non-defaulting party usually takes the form of an “additional expense caused by the delay, 
the hearing on the Rule 55(c) motion, and the introduction of new issues”). 
 132. See id. (“The use of conditions also permits the court to be responsive to the special 
problems raised by particular situations in order to avoid possible inequities.”). 
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C.  Consider Alternative Sanctions as a Factor 
A split of authority exists on whether alternative sanctions, such as 
costs and attorney’s fees, should be considered as a factor when hearing a 
motion to set aside default judgment.133  The Third and Fourth Circuits 
have expressly stated that the district court must consider alternative sanc-
tions as a factor.134  The other circuits, however, have not ruled out alterna-
tive sanctions from consideration.  When hearing a motion to set aside de-
fault judgment, every court should consider the effectiveness of alternative 
sanctions as one of the factors.  This is particularly true in federal courts 
where persuasive authorities from other circuits are routinely cited. 
An informative case is Burton v. Continental Casualty Company out 
of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.135  The Burton 
court cited the Fourth Circuit’s factors for setting aside a default judgment, 
including the effectiveness of alternative sanction, rather than the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s factors.136  Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida quoted the Eleventh Circuit’s general case law on default judg-
ments, then cited the Third Circuit factors (including alternative sanctions), 
and ultimately imposed attorney’s fees on the defaulting party.137  The fac-
tors a court decides to use, regardless of which circuit they come from, are 
“simply means of identifying circumstances which warrant the finding of 
‘good cause’ to set aside a default.”138  Since alternative sanctions have not 
been ruled out, more courts, both state and federal, should follow these per-
suasive authorities and consider the effectiveness of alternative sanctions as 
a factor when ruling on a motion to set aside default judgment. 
D.  Failure to Execute Within One Year as a Factor Under Rule 60(b)(6) 
One of the most troubling problems with the current default judgment 
framework is the possible manipulation of the one-year cutoff of Rule 60.  
To solve this conundrum, the courts should proceed under Rule 60(b)(6) 
when the non-defaulting party sits on the judgment for more than one year 
without contacting the defaulting party.139  This would be akin to the equi-
 
 133. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 134. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 135. Burton v. Cont’l Cas. Co, 431 F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D. Miss. 2006). 
 136. Id. at 657. 
 137. Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., No. 04-20225-CIV, 2008 WL 4467535, at *11–12 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008). 
 138. Id. at *12 (quoting Lexington Lasercomb I.P.A.G. v. Unger, 234 F.R.D. 701, 702 
(S.D. Fla. 2006)). 
 139. One could also argue in favor of requiring the non-defaulting party to give addition-
al notice to the defaulting party.  However, this author does not find such an argument com-
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table doctrine of unclean hands.140  In essence, the prevailing party’s failure 
to execute on the judgment within one year should be considered by the 
courts as a factor towards “any other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 
60(b)(6).  In certain situations, the defaulting party should be allowed to 
argue excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud despite the 
technical one-year cutoff date if the non-defaulting party fails to contact the 
defaulting party within one year of the judgment.141  After all, Rule 
60(b)(6) “provides a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a 
particular case.”142 
A good example of this approach can be found in Byron v. Bleakley 
 
pelling.  So long as there has been proper service, the defaulting party has already received 
the pleading but failed to act accordingly.  In addition, the non-defaulting party may not 
have an accurate mailing address, there might not be an attorney of record, and the original 
pleading may often be filed through the Secretary of State.  Further, placing an additional 
requirement on the non-defaulting party and its counsel would further compound the prob-
lem of lack of compensation for attorney’s fees.  In addition, the summons must, inter alia, 
“notify the defendant that a failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment 
against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(E).  
The Supreme Court has stated: 
  An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.  The notice must be of such nature 
as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable 
time for those interested to make their appearance.  But if with due regard for the 
practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the 
constitutional requirements are satisfied. 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (citations omit-
ted). 
 140. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
814 (1945) (noting “the equitable maxim that ‘he who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands’”).  At least one court has implied that the prevailing party’s delay in collecting 
could constitute laches, abandonment, or estoppel under Rule 60(b)(6) if the defaulting party 
could show prejudice, such as depletion of previously available funds or lapse of previously 
available insurance.  Wheeler v. Springfield Sugar & Prods. Co., 447 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1983). 
 141. As discussed supra note 93 and accompanying text, a showing of excusable neglect, 
new evidence, or fraud, when standing alone, is not sufficient to constitute “any other reason 
that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). 
 142. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana, 24 F.3d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1994) (quo-
ting 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.27[2], at 295 (2d ed. 
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The federal courts have been known to take a 
broad number of factors into consideration under Rule 60(b)(6).  See Suburban Janitorial 
Servs. v. Clarke Am., 863 P.2d 1377, 1383 n.17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (collecting federal 
cases). 
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Transportation Company.143  The defaulting party moved to vacate the 
judgment after two years had passed.144  Even though the defaulting party’s 
grounds may have appeared to constitute excusable neglect at first glance, 
there were additional factors at play: (1) affidavits established a possible 
meritorious defense; (2) the action was brought one day from the expiration 
of the statute of limitations; (3) the defaulting party was no longer engaged 
in the active conduct of that line of business; and (4) plaintiff made no at-
tempt to execute on the judgment until eighteen months had passed.145  
Specifically, the court chose to “view the matter with special care” given 
the lack of any attempt to collect on the judgment by the one-year cutoff 
date.146 
Using the Rules to the best advantage of one’s client is good advocacy and 
the court casts no aspersions on plaintiff’s counsel.  But where the net re-
sult of adhering to the letter of the Rules is to thwart rather than to promote 
justice, the court must be wary of their rigid application. . . . [I]n an unusual 
case such as this the court should not be handicapped by the Rules, which 
are to be construed liberally to achieve justice.147 
 With all of these factors in mind, the court set aside the default judg-
ment as “any other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).148  
More courts should accept the logic and reasoning of Byron and consider 
the lack of execution within one year as a factor under Rule 60(b)(6).149 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current default judgment framework is fraught with problems and 
inequities, including procedural violations on both sides that often go un-
checked.  The primary remedy to these ills is amending Rule 55 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the court discretion in awarding at-
torney’s fees.  The court needs to have the authority to award attorney’s 
fees to the non-defaulting party or to the allegedly defaulting party based 
on the facts of each case.  If Rule 55 is not amended, both state and federal 
 
 143. Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 144. Id. at 414. 
 145. Id. at 415. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 415–16 (citations omitted). 
 148. Id. at 416.  For the improper, laissez faire approach, see Allison v. Boondock’s, 
Sundecker’s & Greenthumb’s, Inc., 673 P.2d 634, 638 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to 
set aside default judgment despite finding that the non-defaulting party’s counsel “used the 
civil rules to her advantage [by] waiting more than a year to execute the judgment.”). 
 149. See Sasso v. M. Fine Lumber Co., Inc., 144 F.R.D. 185, 188–89 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(considering as a factor “plaintiffs’ diligent efforts . . . to collect on the default judgment”). 
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courts should consider attorney’s fees as a condition or a factor to setting 
aside the default judgment.  In addition, the courts should take into account 
the prevailing party’s failure to execute on the judgment within one year as 
a factor towards “any other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).  
With these improvements implemented, there will be fewer faults with the 
default judgment system. 
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